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Abstract. In this paper, a model of political consensus is introduced.
Parties try to reach consensus in forming a government. A government is
defined as a pair consisting of a winning coalition and a policy supported
by this coalition, where a policy consists of policies on given issues. A
party evaluates all governments the party belongs to with respect to some
criteria. We allow the criteria to be of unequal importance to a party.
These criteria concern winning coalitions and policy issues. Parties may
be advised to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation
concerning some government(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in
order to obtain a better political consensus.
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1 Introduction
In the literature, one may find many works on coalition formation theory; see,
for instance, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Axelrod (1970), Baron (1993), De
Swaan (1973), De Vries (1999), Grofman (1982), Kahan and Rapoport (1984),
Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997), Laver and Schofield (1990), Laver and Shepsle
(1990, 1996), McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer (1978), Peleg (1981), Schofield
(1993a, 1993b, 1995), Shepsle (1979), Van Deemen (1991, 1997). An alternative
model of multi-dimensional coalition formation has recently been presented in
Rusinowska et al. (2005). The central notion of this model is the notion of a
stable government, where a government is defined as a pair consisting of a win-
ning coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. A policy is a tuple of
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2policies on given issues. In Rusinowska et al. (2005), necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a stable government are investi-
gated. In this coalition formation model parties are supposed to have preferences
regarding each winning coalition and regarding each policy on the given issues.
These preferences are supposed to be constant and no possibility of adjusting
the preferences of a party is considered.
A consensus model is analyzed in Carlsson et al. (1992), where the authors
study the problem of formalizing consensus, within a set of decision makers
trying to agree on a mutual decision. Convergence to consensus depends on the
decision makers’ willingness to compromise. Contrary to the model proposed in
Rusinowska et al. (2005), in Carlsson et al. (1992), decision makers are often
advised to adjust their preferences in order to obtain a better consensus.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation
in which parties may compromise in order to reach consensus. By combining some
notions of both the consensus model (Carlsson et al. (1992)) and the model of a
stable government (Rusinowska et al. (2005)), a new consensus model of political
decision-making is constructed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a model of coalition for-
mation, and a procedure for consensus reaching within a coalition is presented.
Each coalition ‘entitled’ to form a government tries to reach consensus on a gov-
ernment policy. We also discuss the stability property. In Section 3, we consider
a procedure for choosing a feasible government from among all governments
proposed by the coalitions. In Section 4, we conclude. The paper contains two
appendices. In Appendix A, we present some procedures different from the one
proposed in Section 3. Appendix B presents an example illustrating the notions
of our model of political consensus.
2 Consensus reaching within a coalition
2.1 Preliminaries
Let N be the set of all parties in parliament, where N = {1, ..., n}. LetW denote
the set of all winning coalitions, that is,
W = {T ⊆ N |
∑
i∈T
wi ≥ q}, (1)
where wi is the number of seats received by party i, and q is the quota, i.e., the
number of seats needed for a coalition to be a winning coalition. We assume that
the winning coalitions are ‘entitled’ to form a government.
An important property of a winning coalition is the acceptability. We assume
that each party i ∈ N either accepts or does not accept a winning coalition it
belongs to. Let Wi be the set of all winning coalitions containing party i ∈ N
that are acceptable to party i.
The model concerns the creation of a government. It is assumed that there
are some independent policy issues on which a government has to decide. Let P
3be the set of all policies. A policy is said to be acceptable to party i ∈ N if it is
acceptable to this party with respect to each issue. Let Pi denote the set of all
policies acceptable to party i ∈ N .
A government is defined as a pair g = (S, p), where S is a winning coalition
and p is a policy. Let G denote the set of all governments. We then have
G = {(S, p) | S ∈W ∧ p ∈ P}. (2)
Next, the notion of feasible government is introduced. A government (S, p) is
feasible if both S and p are acceptable to each party belonging to S. Hence, the
set G∗ of all feasible governments is equal to
G∗ = {(S, p) ∈ G | ∀i ∈ S [S ∈Wi ∧ p ∈ Pi]}. (3)
In this model, only feasible governments are considered. We introduce the set of
all feasible coalitions as
W ∗ = {S ∈W | ∃p ∈ P [(S, p) ∈ G∗]}. (4)
Let G∗i be the set of all feasible governments containing party i, that is, for
each i ∈ N ,
G∗i = {(S, p) ∈ G∗ | i ∈ S}. (5)
Of course, it may happen that G∗i = ∅ for some i ∈ N .
A decision maker is a party i ∈ N such that G∗i (= ∅. Let DM denote the set
of all decision makers, i.e.,
DM = {i ∈ N | G∗i (= ∅}. (6)
A feasible government is evaluated by each member of this government with
respect to the given policy issues and with respect to the issue concerning the
coalition. Let X be the finite set of criteria.
First of all, each decision maker evaluates the importance of the criteria.
It may happen that one criterion, for instance, the winning coalition, is more
important to a party than another one, i.e., than a certain policy issue. This
means that it is more important to a given party which parties will form the
government than which policy will be supported by this government. For each
i ∈ DM , we assume αi : X → [0, 1], such that
∀i ∈ DM [
∑
x∈X
αi(x) = 1]. (7)
αi(x) is i’s evaluation of criterion x. One way to determine the αi in practice is
by using the MACBETH software (Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical
Based Evaluation Technique). This is an interactive approach to quantify the
attractiveness of each alternative, such that the measurement scale constructed
is an interval scale; see Bana e Costa and Vansnick (1999), Bana e Costa et
al. (2003), and the web site www.m-macbeth.com. The MACBETH software
4checks the consistency of the initial evaluations, and in case of any inconsistency
it indicates to the user what is the cause of the inconsistency and how to improve
on it in order to reach consistency.
Parties from a feasible coalition try to reach consensus. Let G∗S denote the
set of all feasible governments formed by coalition S ∈W ∗. We then have
G∗ =
⋃
S∈W∗
G∗S . (8)
Since all governments from G∗S are formed by coalition S, one may identify G∗S
with the set of all policies acceptable to all parties from S.
Reaching consensus within a coalition means that the preferences of the par-
ties from this coalition, as well as their evaluation of the importance of all criteria
from X, should be relatively close to each other. When parties from a coalition
reach consensus on a government involving this coalition, they may be confronted
with governments formed by other coalitions, in which case the evaluation of the
criterion ‘winning coalition’ may be quite important.
Given a feasible coalition S ∈ W ∗, each party i ∈ S evaluates each govern-
ment from G∗S with respect to all the criteria. Hence, for each i ∈ S, we assume
fi,S : X ×G∗S → [0, 1] such that
∀x ∈ X [
∑
y∈G∗S
fi,S(x, y) = 1]. (9)
The value fi,S(x, y) is the value of government y ∈ G∗S to party i ∈ DM with
respect to criterion x ∈ X. Again, in practice, given party i and criterion x
the values of fi,S(x, y) for the different governments y ∈ G∗S can be determined
realistically by the MACBETH software.
Moreover, for each i ∈ S, we define βi,S : G∗S → [0, 1] such that
(βi,S(y))y∈G∗S = (αi(x))x∈X · (fi,S(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗S , (10)
where (αi(x))x∈X is the 1× |X| matrix representing the evaluation (comparison)
of the criteria by party i, (fi,S(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗S is the |X|×|G∗S | matrix containing
party i’s evaluation (comparison) of all governments in G∗S with respect to each
criterion in X, and (βi,S(y))y∈G∗S is the ‘output’, i.e., 1× |G∗S | matrix containing
party i’s evaluation of each government in G∗S . Because of (7) and (9),∑
y∈G∗S
βi,S(y) = 1. (11)
2.2 Consensus degree
Let LG∗S denote the set of all mappings βi,S : G∗S → [0, 1]. We define an assess-
ment function d : LG∗S × LG∗S → [0, 1] satisfying the following two conditions:
(i) d(βi,S ,βi,S) = 0 for i ∈ S
5(ii) d(βi,S ,βj,S) = d(βj,S ,βi,S) for i, j ∈ S.
We call δ(βi,S ,βj,S) = 1 − d(βi,S ,βj,S) the consensus degree between decision
makers i and j in coalition S. We may define d(βi,S ,βj,S) by a Euclidean-like
‘distance’ between the corresponding vectors. The higher the consensus (degree),
the smaller the ‘distance’ between pairs of decision makers, i.e., between βi,S
and βj,S . In particular, if d(βi,S ,βj,S) = 0 (i.e., δ(βi,S ,βj,S) = 1), then we say
that i and j are in complete consensus in coalition S. If d(βi,S ,βj,S) = 1 (i.e.,
δ(βi,S ,βj,S) = 0), then we say that i and j are in complete disagreement in
coalition S. Let i, j ∈ S. We propose the Euclidean-like ‘distance’ given by
d(βi,S ,βj,S) =
√√√√ 1|G∗S |
∑
y∈G∗S
(βi,S(y)− βj,S(y))2, (12)
where |G∗S | denotes the number of alternative governments for coalition S.
Next, we define
d∗S = max{d(βi,S ,βj,S) | βi,S ,βj,S ∈ LG∗S}, (13)
and a generalized consensus degree for coalition S as
δ∗S = 1− d∗S . (14)
The generalized consensus degree δ∗S concerns the consensus reached by all the
decision makers from coalition S.
2.3 Consensus reaching
In this sub-section we specify a procedure for consensus reaching within a coali-
tion. If parties are sufficiently willing to compromise, the procedure will result
in reaching consensus, and in proposing one feasible government formed by the
given coalition. A certain consensus degree 0 < δ˜ < 1 is required in the model.
We say that coalition S reaches consensus if the generalized consensus degree δ∗S
is not smaller than δ˜, that is, if δ∗S ≥ δ˜. If δ∗S < δ˜, then the parties do not reach
consensus, of course, if (some of) these parties do not adjust their preferences.
Note that, in particular, if G∗S = {y}, then for each i ∈ S, and for each
x ∈ X, fi,S(x, y) = 1, and hence, for each i ∈ S, βi,S(y) = 1. So, in this case,
δ∗S = 1. This means that if there is only one alternative to a given coalition S,
this coalition will reach (complete) consensus.
Let D∗S be the set of parties from S with most different preferences, that is,
D∗S = {i ∈ S | ∃j ∈ S [d(βi,S ,βj,S) = d∗S ]}. (15)
For each feasible coalition, we assume a kind of mediator, called the chairman.
The chairman does not belong to any party and he is indifferent between all
the parties. The chairman will decide which party from D∗S will be advised to
change its preferences (i.e., evaluations) regarding some government(s) or/and
6the importance of the criteria. It seems reasonable to assume that a party asked
to adjust its preferences is a party iDS ∈ D∗S such that
iDS = arg max
i∈D∗S
∑
j∈S
d(βi,S ,βj,S). (16)
If there are at least two such parties, the chairman chooses one of them. More-
over, the chairman proposes such a change to party iDS that the consensus degree
will increase if this party follows the chairman’s advice. If possible, the chair-
man’s advice should lead to a new consensus degree not smaller than δ˜. If the
party does not agree to adjust its preferences (evaluations) according to the
chairman’s advice, the chairman may propose another change to the same party
or a change to another party. If consensus is reached for a given coalition S, that
is, if the generalized (final) consensus degree is not smaller than δ˜, a consensus
decision for coalition S is determined as follows. We add up the weighted (final)
values of the alternatives to all decision makers from S. For each y ∈ G∗S , the
weighted value βS(y) of alternative y to coalition S is defined as
βS(y) =
∑
i∈S
w′i · βi,S(y), (17)
where for each i ∈ S
w′i =
wi∑
j∈S wj
. (18)
For calculating the βS ’s we decided for the weighted sum, but we could also treat
all the parties equally, and define βS(y) for each y ∈ G∗S as βS(y) =
∑
i∈S βi,S(y).
Coalition S chooses the government y∗S such that
y∗S = arg max
y∈G∗S
βS(y). (19)
If there are two such governments, the chairman chooses one of them.
Generally, if in the chairman’s opinion it does not make any sense to con-
tinue the attempts to reach consensus within the coalition S, the decision making
about forming a government by S is postponed, and the given coalition is in-
volved in no government. This means that the given coalition does not propose
any government to be formed.
2.4 Stability
Let Y be a set of alternatives, and let DM be the set of decision makers involved
in them. We assume that for each i ∈ DM , there is a function βi : Y → [0, 1].
In practice, the values of the βi(y)’s for the different y ∈ Y can be determined
realistically by the MACBETH decision support system.
We say that alternative y′ ∈ Y dominates alternative y ∈ Y in S ⊆ DM
(y′ ,S y) if
∀i ∈ S [βi(y′) ≥ βi(y)] ∧ ∃i ∈ S [βi(y′) > βi(y)]. (20)
7Moreover, we say that alternative y ∈ Y is stable in S with respect to Y if
there is no alternative in Y dominating y in S, that is, if
∀y′ ∈ Y [¬ (y′ ,S y)]. (21)
From the definition of y∗S the following remark is evident.
Remark 1 If y∗S is the government chosen by consensus reaching within coali-
tion S, then y∗S is stable in S with respect to G∗S.
3 Choosing a government
Each feasible coalition S ∈W ∗ in which the parties reach consensus, proposes the
government y∗S agreed upon. If there is only one feasible government proposed,
i.e., if only one coalition managed to reach consensus, this government is chosen,
and finally formed. If there is no feasible government proposed, of course, no
government is formed.
Suppose that at least two feasible governments are proposed, which means
that at least two coalitions succeeded in reaching consensus. Let Y ∗ be the set
of all the governments resulting from consensus reached by feasible coalitions,
where 1 < |Y ∗| ≤ |W ∗|. Let DM∗ be the set of all the parties involved in at
least one consensus government, i.e.,
DM∗ = {i ∈ DM | ∃S ∈W ∗ [i ∈ S ∧ y∗S ∈ Y ∗]}. (22)
Let Y ∗i denote the set of all governments from Y ∗ containing party i ∈ DM∗,
i.e., for each i ∈ DM∗
Y ∗i = {y∗S ∈ Y ∗ | i ∈ S}. (23)
Of course, for each i ∈ DM∗, Y ∗i (= ∅.
Each party i ∈ DM∗ evaluates each government from Y ∗i with respect to all
the criteria from X. Hence, for each i ∈ DM∗, there is fi : X ×Y ∗i → [0, 1] such
that
∀x ∈ X [
∑
y∈Y ∗i
fi(x, y) = 1]. (24)
Again, one may use the MACBETH software in order to determine the values
of fi(x, y) for the different y ∈ Y ∗i , given party i and criterion x.
For each i ∈ DM∗, βi : Y ∗i → [0, 1] is defined by
(βi(y))y∈Y ∗i = (αi(x))x∈X · (fi(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗i . (25)
In order to avoid some ‘dominated’ solutions, we add a condition expressing a
kind of ‘internal stability’. Since we do not restrict feasible coalitions to minimal
winning coalitions, it may happen that there are two coalitions from W ∗ such
that one of them contains the other. Let us consider the following condition.
8We say that a government y∗ = (S∗, p∗) ∈ Y ∗ satisfies internal stability (or, is
internally stable), if
¬ ∃(S, p) ∈ Y ∗ [(S ⊂ S∗ ∨ S∗ ⊂ S) ∧
∀i ∈ S ∩ S∗ [βi(S, p) ≥ βi(y∗)] ∧ ∃i ∈ S ∩ S∗ [βi(S, p) > βi(y∗)]]. (26)
Condition (26) says that there is no subset S of coalition S∗, and S∗ is a subset
of no coalition S that can form its own government y = (S, p) ∈ Y ∗ such that
all parties from S ∩ S∗ evaluate y at least as high as y∗, and at least one party
from S ∩S∗ evaluates y higher than y∗. If this condition were not satisfied, then
the parties from coalition S ∩S∗ would resign from y∗ and form the government
y. Let Y ∗∗ be the set of all internally stable governments, i.e.,
Y ∗∗ = {y∗ ∈ Y ∗ | y∗ is internally stable}. (27)
If there is only one government from Y ∗∗, this government is chosen. Suppose
now that there are at least two such governments, i.e., |Y ∗∗| > 1.
Let Y ∗∗i be the set of all internally stable governments containing party i ∈
DM∗, i.e.,
Y ∗∗i = {y∗S ∈ Y ∗∗ | i ∈ S}. (28)
Let W ∗∗ be the set of all the feasible coalitions forming an internally stable
government, i.e.,
W ∗∗ = {S ∈W ∗ | y∗S ∈ Y ∗∗}, (29)
and let DM∗∗ denote the set of all decision makers involved in at least one
internally stable government, i.e.,
DM∗∗ = {i ∈ DM∗ | ∃S ∈W ∗∗ [i ∈ S]}. (30)
In order to choose a government from Y ∗∗ in case |Y ∗∗| > 1, we propose a
procedure in which the coalition with the highest consensus is awarded, and is
asked to form a government. The government chosen is y(0) = (S(0), p(0)) ∈ Y ∗∗
satisfying the following condition
S(0) = arg max
S∈W∗∗
δ∗S . (31)
Suppose that there are at least two solutions of this condition. We may then
choose the coalition in which two players are most ‘close’ to each other, or, alter-
natively, the coalition with the minimal average distance. Let for each S ∈W ∗∗
c∗S = min{d(βi,S ,βj,S) | i, j ∈ S}. (32)
Moreover, letW ∗∗(0) denote the set of all the solutions of condition (31). Then, the
government chosen by this procedure is a government y(0) = (S(0), p(0)) ∈ Y ∗∗
satisfying the extra condition
S(0) = arg min
S∈W∗∗(0)
c∗S . (33)
In the unlikely case that there are at least two solutions of condition (33), one
may apply other procedures. We discuss some of them in Appendix A.
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In this paper, a consensus model for coalition formation has been proposed. If
parties are willing to compromise, it is always possible to reach consensus, and
to create a feasible government. In the procedure there is an ‘outsider’, called
the chairman, who advises parties how to adjust their preferences. Clearly, the
consensus agreed upon depends on the suggestions of the chairman. First, each
feasible coalition tries to reach consensus within this coalition about the govern-
ment to be formed. Parties consider only feasible governments, i.e., governments
acceptable for all parties belonging to the coalition involved, and if there is only
one feasible government they can form, they agree. If the parties from a given
coalition manage to reach consensus, the coalition proposes to form the govern-
ment agreed upon. This consensus government is stable in the given coalition
with respect to the set of all feasible governments formed by that coalition.
It may happen, of course, that no feasible coalition reaches consensus. In this
case, no final government is created. If there is only one feasible coalition which
reaches consensus, then the government proposed by this coalition is formed.
If there are at least two coalitions that succeed in reaching consensus, that is,
if at least two governments are proposed, we select the governments which are
‘internally stable’. Next, if there are at least two such governments, an extra
procedure is applied in order to choose one of these governments. Essentially,
we propose one such procedure, but some alternative procedures for choosing a
government are considered in the appendix.
The model presented in this paper may be extended by incorporating port-
folio distribution issues into the model. Since a portfolio distribution depends
on a governing coalition, it seems proper to treat ‘portfolio distribution’ as an
additional issue dependent on ‘winning coalition’. Hence, instead of considering
(winning) coalitions only, one may analyze an independent issue consisting of
two dependent sub-issues: ‘winning coalition’ and ‘portfolio distribution’.
The consensus model can also be applied to choosing an alternative from a
set of alternatives by a committee.
The protocol given in this paper can be automatized, resulting in a decision
support system for coalition-government formation. The informational require-
ments of the proposed protocol are demanding, but the MACBETH software
can deliver all information needed in a very rational and perspicuous way; see
Roubens et al. (2006).
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Appendix A: Different procedures of choosing a government
Procedures focused on one party
The main feature of these procedures is that one party from DM∗∗ is asked to
form a government. Let us denote this chosen party by i∗. Party i∗ is appointed
by a kind of chairman or supervisor (for instance, the Queen in the Netherlands).
Most likely, i∗ will be the strongest party, i.e., the party with the greatest number
of seats in parliament, but we leave it open. In principle, i∗ may be each party
from DM∗∗.
In a procedure, which we call quick procedure, party i∗ simply chooses its
best government (if there are more than one, i∗ chooses one of them). Denoting
by y(1) = (S(1), p(1)) ∈ Y ∗∗ the government chosen by using this procedure, we
get
y(1) = arg max
y∈Y ∗∗
i∗
βi∗(y). (34)
Another procedure is a procedure based on negotiations. This procedure
is also based on party i∗, but is not necessarily so advantageous to i∗. We will
denote the government resulting from applying this procedure by y(2) ∈ Y ∗∗. In
this procedure, party i∗ is also asked to form a government, but i∗’s choice of
one government is not sufficient to create it. Forming a final government requires
the approval of all parties belonging to the given feasible coalition. In this case,
the parties are involved in some very simple negotiations. Party i∗ proposes to
form its best government y(1) = (S(1), p(1)) defined in (34), and each party from
S(1) has to react to this offer. A party from S(1) either agrees or disagrees. The
government y(1) is formed, that is, y(2) = y(1), if all parties from S(1) accept the
offer.
If at least one party from S(1) disagrees to form the government y(1), party
i∗ switches to another coalition from W ∗∗ containing party i∗, the one which
forms the second best government from Y ∗∗i∗ to party i∗, etc. We assume that
the parties always behave rationally, and that they prefer any government formed
to no government formed. Then, creating no government from the set Y ∗∗i∗ by
party i∗ means that there is at least one government from Y ∗∗ not containing
party i∗, i.e., Y ∗∗\Y ∗∗i∗ (= ∅. In this case, our chairman appoints another party to
continue forming a final government. This new ‘leader’ has to be involved in at
least one government from the set Y ∗∗ \ Y ∗∗i∗ , and it may (but does not have to)
be the strongest party involved in a government from Y ∗∗ \Y ∗∗i∗ . This new party,
let us say, party j∗, evaluates all the governments from the set Y ∗∗j∗ ∩(Y ∗∗ \Y ∗∗i∗ ),
and it proposes to form the one which is best to party j∗, etc. We repeat the
procedure as long as the final government has not been chosen.
The procedure based on negotiations is now being used both in Finland and
in the Netherlands, where the strongest party is asked to form a government.
If this party turns out to be not successful, another party is asked to form a
government. The procedure is worked out in more detail in [?].
Procedure based on total gain
One may also consider a procedure which gives a result maximizing the total
value for all parties from DM∗∗. As was suggested before, let us assume now
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that each party i ∈ DM∗∗ has an evaluation of each government from the set
Y ∗∗ with respect to all the criteria from X, whether the party belongs to this
government or not. Hence, for each i ∈ DM∗∗, we assume Fi : X × Y ∗∗ → [0, 1]
such that
∀x ∈ X [
∑
y∈Y ∗∗
Fi(x, y) = 1], (35)
and define Bi : Y ∗∗ → [0, 1] by
(Bi(y))y∈Y ∗∗ = (αi(x))x∈X · (Fi(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗∗ . (36)
Again, one may use the MacBeth software to determine the values of Fi(x, y).
The government chosen by using this procedure is a government y(3) = (S(3), p(3)) ∈
Y ∗∗ satisfying the following condition
y(3) = arg max
y∈Y ∗∗
∑
i∈DM∗∗
W ′i ·Bi(y), (37)
where for each i ∈ DM∗∗
W ′i =
wi∑
j∈DM∗∗ wj
. (38)
If there is more than one government satisfying this condition, some extra
method(s) may be applied. Suppose that, for instance, there are two govern-
ments satisfying this condition, but the majority of the decision makers prefers
one of them. Then, this government preferred by the majority may be chosen.
Condition (37) says that the government y(3) maximizes the weighted sum
of the values Bi(y) of all decision makers i from DM∗∗. Of course, this does not
mean that the government is the best for the parties forming this government.
This chosen government may be, for instance, more popular among the parties
not belonging to this government, but less advantageous to its members.
Appendix B: Example
In order to illustrate the main procedure for consensus reaching (described in
Section 2 and Section 3), let us analyze the following simple example. We consider
a parliament consisting of five parties,
N = {A,B,C,D,E},
with the quota q = 51, and the following weights of the parties:
wA = 30, wB = 20, wC = 17, wD = 18, wE = 15.
Hence, there are 15 winning coalitions, but not all these coalitions are acceptable
to their members. Neither party A nor B does accept any coalition with E. Party
E in its turn does not accept any coalition either with A or with B. Moreover,
party C does not accept any coalition with D, and D does not accept any
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coalition with C (see [16] on the willingness to cooperate). Hence, we have only
two winning coalitions acceptable to all their members, that is, coalition ABC
and ABD. Using the notation from Section 2, we have
WA = {ABC,ABD}, WB = {ABC,ABD}
WC = {ABC}, WD = {ABD}, WE = ∅.
Moreover, suppose there are four policies, i.e.,
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4},
with respect to two policy issues x1 and x2. Hence, the set of all criteria is equal
to
X = {x1, x2, x3},
where criterion x3 concerns the winning coalition. Assume that both parties A
and B accept all four policies, party C does not accept policy p4, and D does
not accept policy p3. Hence, we have
PA = PB = P, PC = {p1, p2, p3}, PD = {p1, p2, p4}.
The set of all feasible governments is then equal to
G∗ = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6},
where
y1 = (ABC, p1), y2 = (ABC, p2), y3 = (ABC, p3)
y4 = (ABD, p1), y5 = (ABD, p2), y6 = (ABD, p4).
Moreover, using the notation from Section 2, we have
G∗A = G
∗
B = G
∗, G∗C = {y1, y2, y3}, G∗D = {y4, y5, y6}, G∗E = ∅
G∗ABC = {y1, y2, y3}, G∗ABD = {y4, y5, y6}.
The set of all decision makers DM , and the set of all feasible coalitions W ∗ are
equal to
DM = {A,B,C,D}, W ∗ = {ABC,ABD}.
We assume the required consensus degree δ˜ = 0.85.
The parties’ evaluations of the importance of the criteria are as follows:
αA = (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
), αB = (
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
), αC = (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
2
), αD = (
1
6
,
1
3
,
1
2
).
Moreover, the comparison matrices for the parties are the following:
(fA,ABC(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABC =

1
3
1
6
1
2
1
3
1
6
1
2
1
3
1
3
1
3

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(fB,ABC(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABC =

1
4
1
4
1
2
1
6
1
6
2
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

(fC,ABC(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABC =

1
2
1
3
1
6
1
3
1
2
1
6
1
3
1
3
1
3

(fA,ABD(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABD =

1
2
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
4
1
3
1
3
1
3

(fB,ABD(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABD =

1
6
1
6
2
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

(fD,ABD(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABD =

1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
 .
Hence, we get
(βA,ABC(y))y∈G∗ABC = (
3
9
,
2
9
,
4
9
), (βA,ABD(y))y∈G∗ABD = (
8
18
,
5
18
,
5
18
)
(βB,ABC(y))y∈G∗ABC = (βB,ABD(y))y∈G∗ABD = (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
2
)
(βC,ABC(y))y∈G∗ABC = (
3
8
,
3
8
,
2
8
), (βD,ABD(y))y∈G∗ABD = (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
).
Consensus reaching within coalition ABC
Since G∗ABC (= ∅, parties A, B, and C will try to reach consensus concerning the
alternatives y1, y2, and y3. We get
0.06 < d(βA,ABC ,βB,ABC) < 0.07, 0.14 < d(βA,ABC ,βC,ABC) < 0.15
0.17 < d(βB,ABC ,βC,ABC) < 0.18.
Hence,
d∗ABC = d(βB,ABC ,βC,ABC) > 0.17,
and hence, the generalized consensus degree for coalition ABC is
δ∗ABC = 1− d∗ABC < 0.83 < 0.85 = δ˜.
Moreover,
D∗ABC = {B,C},
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which means that either B or C will be asked by the chairman to adjust its
preferences. We check which party will be appointed as party iDABC . Since the
distance between A and C is greater than the distance between A and B, we
have ∑
j∈ABC
d(βC,ABC ,βj,ABC) >
∑
j∈ABC
d(βB,ABC ,βj,ABC),
and hence iDABC = C. This means that party C will be advised to adjust its
preferences. Let us suppose that the chairman advises party C to change its
evaluation of the governments with respect to the first criterion, x1. Let the new
preferences of C be as follows
(f ′C,ABC(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABC =

1
3
1
6
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
6
1
3
1
3
1
3
 .
With respect to criterion x1, both parties A and B like the third alternative y3
most. Hence, if party C changes its evaluation of the governments with respect
to x1 such that y3 becomes the best alternative to C, party C’s preferences will
become ‘closer’ to the preferences of parties A and B. Suppose that party C
agrees to follow the advice of the chairman. Hence, the new values are equal to
(β′C,ABC(y))y∈G∗ABC = (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
),
and hence we get
d(β′A,ABC ,β
′
B,ABC) = d(βA,ABC ,βB,ABC) < 0.07, 0.09 < d(β
′
A,ABC ,β
′
C,ABC) < 0.1
0.11 < d(β′B,ABC ,β
′
C,ABC) < 0.12.
Hence, now,
d∗ABC = d(β
′
B,ABC ,β
′
C,ABC) < 0.12,
and consequently,
δ∗ABC > 0.88 > 0.85 = δ˜.
This means, of course, that parties A, B, and C, reach consensus. In order to
find a consensus decision, we calculate the following values
w′A =
30
67
, w′B =
20
67
, w′C =
17
67
.
Moreover, for k = 1, 2, 3, we calculate
βABC(yk) = w′A · βA,ABC(yk) + w′B · βB,ABC(yk) + w′C · β′C,ABC(yk),
and we get
βABC(y1) =
62
201
, βABC(y2) =
52
201
, βABC(y3) =
87
201
.
This means that coalition ABC proposes government y3, i.e,
y∗ABC = y3.
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Consensus reaching within coalition ABD
In a similar way, one may consider consensus reaching within coalition ABD,
since G∗ABD (= ∅. Parties A, B, and D will try to reach consensus concerning
alternatives y4, y5, and y6. Let us suppose that after consensus reaching within
coalition ABD, the coalition proposes government y4, i.e.,
y∗ABD = y4.
Choosing one government
In our example, two governments are proposed: y3 = (ABC, p3) by coalition
ABC, and y4 = (ABD, p1) by coalition ABD. Since ABC (⊂ ABD, and ABD (⊂
ABC, both governments are internally stable. Using the notations from Sec-
tion 3, we get
Y ∗∗ = Y ∗ = {y3, y4}, W ∗∗ =W ∗ = {ABC,ABD}
DM∗∗ = DM∗ = {A,B,C,D}.
Hence, since |Y ∗∗| = 2 > 1, we will apply to this example the procedure intro-
duced in Section 3. Taking into account the parties’s preferences mentioned in
the beginning of this example, we have the following
(fA(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗A = (FA(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗∗ =

3
5
2
5
3
5
2
5
1
3
2
3
 .
This matrix is derived from matrix M = (fA,ABC(x, y))x∈X,y∈G∗ABC as follows.
The first row concerns the relative preferences of A for the policy p3 of y3,
and the policy p1 of y4 with respect to criterion x1. The first row of matrix M
tells us that the preferences of A for p3 and p1 with respect to criterion x1 are
proportional to 12 :
1
3 , which is proportional to
3
5 :
2
5 , where
3
5 +
2
5 = 1. A similar
argument gives the second row. The third row concerns the relative preferences
of A for y3 and y4 with respect to criterion x3, i.e., with respect to the coalitions
ABC and ABD. In our matrix we have assumed that A prefers the coalition
ABD twice as much as the coalition ABC.
(fB(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗B = (FB(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗∗ =

2
3
1
3
4
5
1
5
2
3
1
3

(fC(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗C = (fD(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗D =
11
1

(FC(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗∗ =

3
5
2
5
1
3
2
3
1 0
 , (FD(x, y))x∈X,y∈Y ∗∗ =
0 10 1
0 1
 .
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(Note that the matrix FC is derived from the matrix f ′C,ABC and not from
fC,ABC). Hence,
(βA(y))y∈Y ∗A = (BA(y))y∈Y ∗∗ = (
23
45
,
22
45
)
(βB(y))y∈Y ∗B = (BB(y))y∈Y ∗∗ = (
7
10
,
3
10
), (βC(y3)) = (βD(y4)) = 1
(BC(y))y∈Y ∗∗ = (
11
15
,
4
15
), (BD(y))y∈Y ∗∗ = (0, 1).
In our example,
δ∗ABC = δ
∗
ABD = 1−
1√
72
,
and hence, we apply the ‘closest’ condition. We have
c∗ABC = d(βA,ABC ,βB,ABC) =
1
36
√
14
3
> 0.06
c∗ABD = d(β
′
A,ABD,β
′
B,ABD) =
√
2
36
< 0.04,
and therefore
S(0) = ABD, y(0) = y4.
Let us see what the outcome would be under the other procedures discussed
in Appendix A. Suppose that the supervisor appoints the strongest party, i.e.,
party A to choose the government. Hence, if we apply the quick procedure, we
get
y(1) = y3.
If we introduce negotiations, then party A proposes government y3, and hence,
parties B and C have to react. Party B says ‘yes’, since it prefers y3 to y4, and
also party C agrees, since y3 is the only one government it belongs to. Hence,
we also get
y(2) = y3.
Next, we apply the procedure of total gains.
W ′A =
30
85
, W ′B =
20
85
, W ′C =
17
85
, W ′D =
18
85
,
and therefore∑
i∈DM∗∗
W ′i ·Bi(y3) =
209
425
,
∑
i∈DM∗∗
W ′i ·Bi(y4) =
216
425
.
Hence, the procedure based on total gain yields
y(3) = y4.
Note that this method does not have to represent the preferences of the majority
of parties from DM∗∗, since party D is the only one which prefers y4 to y3.
